Myanmar

Since the military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, the country has been plunged into deep internal conflict. The coup ousted the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD), marking the return of full military rule after a decade of semi-democracy. Here's a summary of the key developments:

1. The Coup and Immediate Aftermath (February 2021)

• The military, known as the Tatmadaw, seized power just before the NLD was set to begin its second term, claiming widespread electoral fraud in the 2020 general elections. The coup was backed by the military’s control of the constitution and its significant influence in Myanmar's political landscape.
• Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other top NLD leaders were arrested, and a state of emergency was declared. The Tatmadaw's actions were met with widespread protests and civil disobedience campaigns (CDM), which quickly spread across the country.

2. Mass Protests and Civil Disobedience (Spring 2021)

• Millions of people took to the streets in massive protests demanding the restoration of democracy and the release of political prisoners. Workers in various sectors, including healthcare, education, and government services, participated in the civil disobedience movement, halting daily operations.
• The military responded with increasing violence, deploying security forces to disperse crowds, leading to the deaths of hundreds of protesters. The international community strongly condemned the violence, but no significant action was taken to curb the junta’s power.

3. Formation of the National Unity Government (NUG)

• In response to the coup, ousted lawmakers and pro-democracy groups formed the National Unity Government (NUG), composed of former NLD leaders and ethnic groups, in an attempt to offer an alternative to the military regime. The NUG has received some recognition from international organizations but has faced challenges in gaining significant influence within Myanmar.
• The NUG also aligned itself with armed ethnic groups and insurgent factions, calling for a federal democracy and the end of military rule.

4. Armed Resistance and Civil War

• Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), which had been fighting for autonomy in various regions for decades, intensified their resistance against the military junta. The People’s Defense Forces (PDF), a loose coalition of pro-democracy fighters, emerged as an armed resistance group made up of former protesters, ethnic militias, and defectors from the military.
• These groups have carried out ambushes, attacks on military convoys, and targeted strikes against military infrastructure. The junta has responded with brutal crackdowns, including airstrikes and large-scale massacres, leading to rising casualties on both sides and pushing the country into full-scale civil war in many regions.

5. Humanitarian Crisis and Escalating Violence

• The military has targeted civilians, and the country’s civilian infrastructure has been severely impacted by the conflict. This includes bombings of villages, arbitrary detentions, mass killings, and human rights abuses, which have been widely condemned by international human rights organizations.
• There has been an increasing number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), with thousands fleeing to neighboring countries like Thailand and Bangladesh, while many others have been displaced within Myanmar’s borders, particularly in ethnic minority regions like Chin State and Kayin State.

6. Economic Collapse

• The political instability and ongoing conflict have severely crippled Myanmar’s economy. International sanctions imposed on the military regime and the disruption caused by civil disobedience and armed conflict have led to widespread poverty, inflation, and unemployment.
• Key sectors, such as oil, gas, and manufacturing, have been hit hard, and businesses have fled the country, further exacerbating the economic crisis.

7. International Responses

• While the coup was widely condemned by Western countries, sanctions were imposed on Myanmar's military leaders and business interests tied to the junta. However, ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and China have been more reluctant to take strong action, with ASEAN adopting a "five-point consensus" that has failed to bring about any meaningful change.
• The United Nations and international human rights organizations have continuously criticized the military for its violent repression, but diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict have largely stalled.

8. Ongoing Struggle and Stalemate

• As of 2025, Myanmar remains in a state of turmoil. The military junta has not been able to fully suppress the resistance, and armed conflict continues in many regions of the country.
• The NUG, the PDF, and ethnic militias are still fighting for a democratic and federal Myanmar, but the situation is dire, with no clear path to peace in sight.
• International involvement has been minimal, and Myanmar’s internal conflict remains one of the most devastating in Southeast Asia.

In summary, Myanmar's internal conflict since the 2021 coup has escalated into a violent and protracted civil war, with large-scale human rights abuses, a deteriorating economy, and a fractured political landscape. The military junta has struggled to maintain control, while various pro-democracy and ethnic resistance groups continue to fight for change.

Development of Scam Centers

During political instability in Myanmar, especially after the 2021 coup, has contributed to a range of criminal activities, including the rise of scam centers in the country's Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other regions, many of which are linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the situation is quite complex, and while the Chinese government (CCP) has taken a more hands-off approach in this instance, Chinese criminal organizations have seized the opportunity to expand their operations, using the region as a hub for illicit activities.

1. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and SEZs

Myanmar is a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to create infrastructure and trade links across Asia, Africa, and Europe. As part of this initiative, Myanmar’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs), particularly the Kyaukpyu SEZ and the Thilawa SEZ, have been developed with Chinese investment to enhance trade, transportation, and industry. These areas were initially meant to bring economic development to Myanmar through infrastructure projects like ports, railways, and highways.

However, the political chaos that erupted after the coup has caused a shift in priorities, especially in the economic and security landscape. The military junta’s internal struggle, combined with ongoing protests and civil disobedience, created a fertile environment for criminal organizations to thrive, including those connected to Chinese networks.

2. The Role of Chinese Organized Crime Groups

While China itself has focused on strengthening its regional influence through BRI, and while state-backed enterprises were initially involved in Myanmar’s SEZ development, a significant portion of the area is now being exploited by Chinese organized crime syndicates. These groups, often tied to illegal activities in Southeast Asia, have taken advantage of the weak law enforcement and porous borders in the region to set up scam centers, illegal gambling operations, drug trafficking, and other illicit businesses. They exploit the lack of government oversight in Myanmar, especially in the aftermath of the coup, and the inability of the military junta to control criminal elements.

Scam centers are often involved in online fraud, targeting global victims through fake investments, romance scams, cryptocurrency fraud, and other cybercrimes. These centers are known for using sophisticated methods to launder money, defraud people, and run large-scale scams often linked to Chinese mafia networks. Many of these operations are run in areas of Myanmar where Chinese investments and labor are prevalent, such as in SEZs or border zones.

The Chinese organized crime syndicates have expanded their presence in Myanmar’s SEZs because these areas are often semi-autonomous with limited law enforcement capacity, making them ideal for illicit activities. These areas are also somewhat insulated from local oversight, creating a conducive environment for money laundering, human trafficking, and other criminal enterprises.

3. Lack of Control by the Chinese Government

While the Chinese government has largely focused on the infrastructure and economic benefits of the BRI in Myanmar, it has taken a relatively hands-off approach when it comes to these criminal operations. The CCP's focus has been more on stabilizing its investments and continuing its regional economic strategy rather than cracking down on organized crime.

However, the Chinese government is still indirectly involved, as many of the scam centers and other criminal operations are run by individuals or groups with ties to China, but the CCP itself may not have direct control over them. The lack of strong Chinese diplomatic or legal intervention in this context has allowed these activities to flourish without significant consequences for the perpetrators.

Chinese organized crime groups operate in a gray area where they use Myanmar’s instability to run illegal operations, but they are careful to keep their activities below the radar of the central government in China. They often operate in collaboration with local criminal actors, exploiting Myanmar's chaotic political situation and weak governance.

4. Impact on Myanmar and the Region

The rise of scam centers and organized crime in Myanmar’s SEZs has had a detrimental impact on the region’s stability. Beyond the direct harm caused by the scams themselves, these criminal operations also fuel corruption within Myanmar’s already fragile political system. They provide funding to local officials and even the military, creating a symbiotic relationship that further entrenches the junta’s power.

Furthermore, these criminal operations have harmed Myanmar's global image, making it harder for legitimate foreign investors to engage with the country. The military junta's failure to clamp down on criminal activities has made Myanmar a hotspot for cybercrime and illicit trade, which could affect regional stability, especially given Myanmar’s location between China, Thailand, and Bangladesh.

5. A Missed Opportunity for Development

The intention behind the Belt and Road Initiative was to use Myanmar’s SEZs as hubs for legitimate economic growth, bringing in much-needed infrastructure and investment. Instead, political instability and the rise of criminal networks have undermined these efforts, leaving many areas in a state of lawlessness. The involvement of Chinese organized crime in these zones, while not directly endorsed by the Chinese government, is a reflection of the instability and lack of governance in Myanmar.

In conclusion, while the Chinese government focuses on BRI’s infrastructural projects in Myanmar, Chinese organized crime groups have seized the opportunity to establish scam centers and other illicit operations in the country’s SEZs, taking advantage of Myanmar’s political chaos and weak law enforcement. This has created a complex situation where Myanmar, initially seen as a key partner in China's regional ambitions, is now struggling with organized crime, economic collapse, and a deepening internal conflict that continues to escalate.

Combating Scam Centers

In response to the significant global harm caused by scam centers operating along the Thai-Myanmar border, the Thai government has implemented decisive measures to disrupt these illicit activities. On February 5, 2025, Thailand cut off electricity, internet, and fuel supplies to five areas in Myanmar known for housing scam operations, including towns such as Myawaddy and Tachilek.

This action was driven by public demand for government intervention and aims to sever the operational capabilities of criminal syndicates responsible for extensive financial losses and human exploitation. These syndicates have coerced numerous individuals into conducting online scams, resulting in daily losses estimated at 80 million baht (approximately $2.3 million).

The crackdown was anticipated due to increasing international pressure, particularly following high-profile incidents such as the abduction of Chinese actor Wang Xing, who was rescued from a scam center in Myanmar. This event highlighted the pervasive nature of these criminal networks and underscored the need for coordinated action.

Beyond cutting utilities, Thai law enforcement is exploring additional strategies to combat these scam centers:

• Supply Chain Interdiction: Authorities plan to intercept and block the transfer of essential equipment used by scammers, such as receivers, antennas, SIM boxes, and satellite internet devices, to prevent these tools from reaching the scam centers. citeturn0search5
• International Collaboration: The Royal Thai Police are establishing an international coordination center to work with foreign embassies. This initiative aims to prevent foreign nationals from being recruited into scam operations in Myanmar, thereby disrupting the human resources of these networks.
• Legal Reforms: Thailand is enacting new laws to hold banks and telecommunications companies accountable for compensating scam victims, thereby encouraging these institutions to implement stricter security measures and report suspicious activities promptly.

These comprehensive efforts reflect Thailand's commitment to dismantling scam centers and mitigating the associated harms, both domestically and internationally.